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LICENSING: PERMISSION SLIPS IN CORPORATE
AND FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
Saul Levmore*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article suggests the beginning of a general theory of licensing
systems. I use the word license to refer to legally meaningful approval of-
fered or required relatively early in a system of social control or private
agreement. The presence of a licensing apparatus has implications for
other, related tools so that the presence of a certification requirement or
permission component will draw attention to the larger system of controls
or incentives in which it is embedded. Generally speaking, a control, or
regulatory, system can focus on inputs or outputs, and inputs can be exam-
ined from an ex ante-upfront"--or ex post---"outcome-oriented"--van-
tage point. Thus, a negligence rule can normally be thought of as focusing
on inputs from an ex post perspective, because it awaits an accident, or loss
measured from some baseline, before asking about the character of the ac-
tivity that caused this loss and the untaken precautions that might have
averted the loss. Some strict liability systems can be thought of as geared to
outputs and from an ex post perspective, because actors pay according to
the injuries they actually cause. In turn, most (of what I will call) licensing
systems pay considerable attention to inputs from an ex ante perspective.
For example, one might need a license to operate a motor vehicle, market a
drug, or search private premises.
A general theory of licensing needs to grapple with (at least) three
questions that reappear in disparate contexts: When are licensing tech-
niques likely to be superior, in either functional or evolutionary terms?
When should-or will-licensing requirements squeeze out seemingly du-
plicative, alternative means of social control? When should---or might-li-
censing be privatized as, for example, by the simple requirement that an
actor be bonded by a private insurer who, in turn, would be free, with some
enforcement help from the state, to set requirements for insurability? Mar-
ket forces can be liberated in other ways as well. Thus, many licensing
schemes raise the question of whether improvement is possible by simply
* William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am grateful for suggestions made
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permitting private parties to pay for speedier regulatory service. My intui-
tion is that these questions benefit from a substantial dose of public choice
.theory, combined with considerations usually associated with work on de-
terrence and transaction costs!
My focus in this Article, however, is not on these general questions
about licensing, but rather on the disclosure element in licensing, or permis-
sion, schemes. The present Article does deal with the familiar problem of
the consequences of a failure to comply with licensing requirements. The
examples it I use raise questions about information and disclosure, and are
selected in part to encourage an expansive conception of licensing. In ad-
dition to emphasizing this conception, or variety of licensing, I suggest that
less information can sometimes be better than more. More specifically, I
develop two ideas: first, in some settings the withholding of information
might generate superior, unbiased licensing judgments and, second, the law
might reflect some sensitivity to the likelihood that revelations are socially
harmful. Lurking in the background of this examination is the hope that
analysis of these specific points can begin to illuminate the grander ques-
tions regarding licensing schemes.
Part II begins with some rules governing corporate fiduciaries. Al-
though the discussion might stand on its own, as a kind of old-fashioned
case commentary or collection of ideas for classroom lectures on the sub-
jects of corporate opportunities and self-interested transactions on the part
of fiduciaries, I hope to show a number of interesting connections to li-
censing problems more generally. There is often an opportunity for fiduci-
aries to obtain consent, or a license, before investing or transacting in a way
that is likely to lead to later conflict. The comparison between this private,
or contractual sort of permission, or even ex ante regulation of an agent, and
a more conventional licensing system, organized by a regulatory authority
and often bounded by legislatively drawn categories and requirements, may
seem far-fetched at the outset, but it offers a useful way to get at some of
the complexities associated with licensing.2 As is often the case, there is
but a thin line between the private and public, and the former can inform the
latter.
1 There are, of course, familiar reasons for preferring various regulatory systems. Outcome-oriented
systems are sometimes attractive because they create a convenient class of plaintiffs, reduce the number
of claims, and more directly achieve a compensatory or redistributive goal. In turn, upfront systems
may be superior in providing readier deterrence, dealing with judgment-proof actors, and avoiding
problems associated with a causation (which is to say outcome) requirement. None of these considera-
tions plays a role in this Article and, indeed, I even set aside public choice considerations, though I re-
gard these as most important in explaining or structuring licensing systems. The focus here is on
disclosure, and the idea that less may be more.
2 A fuller discussion of licensing would require discussion of legislatively drawn rules, such as
minimum age requirements, alongside administrative judgments, as through on-the-road driving tests.
The text also hints at the need for comparing public and private licensing if only because such a com-
parison may be a useful way to think about the duplication or exclusivity ex ante licensing might offer a
regulatory scheme.
HeinOnline  -- 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 710 1998-1999
Permission Slips in Corporate and Fourth Amendment Law
In Part Ill, the analysis is narrowed again to one area of law, search
warrants. It is one where the regulatory scheme comes closer to conven-
tional licensing because permission is sought from third parties-legal
authorities empowered to issue warrants-rather than from contractual part-
ners. I try again to develop some freestanding arguments while beginning
to identify some common threads among licensing regimes. This identifi-
cation process strengthens the conclusion that there is more variety to li-
censing than is normally recognized. On the other hand, the arguments
about the occasional desirability of less information rather than more, while
quite provocative with regard to search warrants, turn out to be of little pre-
dictive value.
II. THE REAL RULE FOR CORPORATE FIDUCIARIES4
A. Disclosure and its Complexities
The rules governing corporate fiduciaries can, at least conventionally,
be described as focusing on inputs from an ex post perspective. Unlike the
classical trustee who must not "wear two hats" but rather must follow what
I have called elsewhere a separation strategy,5 the corporate fiduciary may
divide loyalties so long as the conflicted fiduciary is prepared to bear the
burden of proving that the transaction was fair, which is to say met the
standard of an arm's length bargain. Students of corporate law know that
this law has gone through a number of stages. There was a time when self-
interested contracts were simply voidable at the option of the corporation or
its shareholders, but the conventional and enlightened modem view is that
the law (and the parties) recognizes the potential gains from trade with
(even) well-positioned, conflicted parties.6 In closely held firms, opportu-
nities for such gains might arise especially frequently, so that a corporate
officer who sells private property to the corporation is now said to bear the
burden of showing that the price was no greater than that which would
likely have emerged in a hypothetical bargain between unrelated parties.
3 With these examples drawn from corporate law and search warrant law I try to accomplish the first
goal of this Article, which is to suggest that we might see much of law through the lens of licensing. In
defining licensing as I have, there is the danger, or temptation, that we will think of virtually every legal
rule as a licensing requirement because most rules generate consequences, or secondary rules, upon
violation. The danger is that we are unlikely to learn much from common threads if these threads are
seen as forming a seamless web connecting all of law. On the other hand, the benefits of a new per-
spective are likely to be enjoyed only if the perspective incorporates phenomena not previously linked to
one another. The examples offered here are therefore selected because they are somewhat different-
but not too different-from conventional examples of licensing schemes.
4 1 am indebted to Hideki Kanda, with whom I long ago enjoyed conversations regarding the possi-
bility that disclosure was the essence of the "real," unstated rule in much of corporate law.
5 See Saul Levmore, Efficiency and Conspiracy: Conflicts of Interest, Anti-Nepotism Rules, and
Separation Strategies, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2099 (1998).
6 See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 160-66 (1986).
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As a practical matter, the seller might solicit several appraisals at the time
of the sale because this evidence, developed from an ex ante perspective,
might be useful later if the transaction is challenged in a court forced to
think about the exchange from an ex post perspective, when the deal is
likely to have turned out to be an unattractive one for the corporation. Per-
haps the most obvious thing to say about the array of fiduciary rules is that
where monitoring is likely to be very poor, as with minors or other benefi-
ciaries of a classical trust, the law offers a simple relationship where op-
portunities for profitable churning or other self-dealing by the fiduciary are
quite limited. Relatively able investors are, however, more eager to gain
from potential trades and they can monitor and occasionally object if they
feel disadvantaged by their agent's conflict of interest. Potential coventur-
ers who are still more inclined toward freewheeling relationships, uncon-
strained by background rules that encourage the reconstruction of bargains
or (as we will see) disclosure, might try to structure their arrangements so
as to trigger the rules conventionally attached to contract law rather than
those associated with ongoing, "fiduciary" relationships.
Observers of corporate law will also know of some immediate, if ob-
scure, connections to considerations of licensing, or advance permission. In
the first place, there was a period in the early 1900s when the rule was said
to be that "a contract between a director and his corporation was valid if it
was approved by a disinterested majority of his fellow directors and was not
found to be unfair or fraudulent by the court if challenged."7 The approval
process can be seen as a licensing requirement or option.8 Second, there is
a respectable view-and explicit state statutes to the effect-that the modem
rule is to permit self-dealing if fair (viewing and reconstructing the terms of
the bargain from an ex post perspective) or if approved by a majority of
properly informed shareholders or disinterested board members.9 There is
7 See id. at 160 (discussing Harold Marsh Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Cor-
porate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966)).
8 To the extent that the contract could be valid even if there were no approval by disinterested di-
rectors, there was something less than a licensing requirement. If the approval amounted to a safe har-
bor, then the analogy is to licensing as an alternative to regulation through ex post review or lawsuits. In
practice, of course, most licensing systems are at least partially duplicative; licensing schemes for motor
vehicle operators or nuclear power plants, for instance, do not take the place of tort systems, and ex-
panded tort law in such areas as professional malpractice has not generated deregulation of entry or con-
tinuing education requirements in the same professions. Most licensing schemes are thus duplicative
rather than alternative.
9 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 144 (West 1997); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 805, § 5/8.60 (West 1998); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1997). According to the
Committee on Corporate Laws, by January 1, 1998 36 jurisdictions had adopted statutes that provide
that conflict of interest transactions are not automatically void or voidable if they are either (1) found
fair, (2) approved by a disinterested majority of the board of directors, or (3) approved by informed
shareholders. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.61 note on statutory comparison (Supp. 1997)
(listing and discussing statutes); see also Robert A. Wachsler, Inc. v. Florafax Int'l, Inc., 778 F.2d 547
(10th Cir. 1985) (holding invalid a contract entered into with a corporation owned by one of the direc-
tors because the contract had been neither (1) formally ratified by the shareholders or disinterested di-
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therefore the possibility that an interested party can obtain permission to
engage in a conflicted transaction and that this permission will serve to
protect the fiduciary against the dangers of an ex post review. Moreover,
this hornbook law1 description of what I have called a licensing option,
with licensing playing an alternative rather than duplicative regulatory role,
leaves but a modest gap for fitting connections to the more general ques-
tions about licensing systems. In the corporate context, "private" law can
be seen as improving on an outcome-oriented system by offering parties a
kind of safe harbor, or optional, alternative license.
The rules just implicated have a sufficiently familiar feel and textbook
quality that the decided cases themselves can come to seem wrongly de-
cided almost without exception.11 Consider, for example, Hawaiian Inter-
national Finances, Inc. v. Pablo,2 a fairly representative case. Pablo, the
corporation's president, had been traveling to California at his own expense
and in connection with his own real estate business. After returning to Ha-
waii and encouraging the corporation to invest in California real estate, he
and several other representatives of the corporation were sent back to Cali-
fornia where they decided to purchase two parcels of land on behalf of the
corporation. Eventually, other shareholders and officers of the firm learned
that the California real estate brokers who had represented the sellers of
these properties split their commissions with Pablo; as a licensed real estate
agent himself, Pablo had expected some income of this sort but there was
no formal agreement between Pablo and these sellers' agents. Pablo's de-
fense was that the corporation was unharmed because it could not have
shared in the commissions inasmuch as it was not a licensed real estate
agent. The court confuses things a bit by referring to the law governing a
classical trustee rather than a business partner or insider, but it sensibly
concludes that had Pablo disclosed his anticipated commissions, others
might have seen room to bargain for a better price. The decision is against
Pablo, who is required to disgorge the commissions he received.
One of the noteworthy things about the decision is that it contains no
discussion of the fairness, or arm's length character, of the bargain. Indeed,
rectors nor (2) informally ratified by the acquiescence of adequately informed shareholders); Levy v.
Markal Sales Corp., 643 N.E.2d 1206 (II. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that directors of a consumer elec-
tronics and audio equipment manufacturer could not act as sales representatives for a computer manu-
facturer before informing the corporation of the opportunity and allowing the corporation to reject the
opportunity).
10 By which I mean sophisticated hornbook law, for it is precisely the evolution descnbed and well-
defended in CLARK, supra note 6, at 159-89.
11 Experienced observers of corporate law will know that the description offered up to this point has
also been-intentionally--misleading in almost every respect. Thus, a well-known Iowa case, Cookies
Food Prods. v. Lakes Warehouse Distnib., 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1988), recognizes that the relevant
state statute permits self-dealing by a director if there is either board ratification, shareholder authoriza-
tion, or a fair and reasonable transaction, but goes on to insist that even with disclosure the fiduciary
bears the burden of showing fairness.
12 488 P.2d 1172 (Haw. 1971).
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the corporation's failure to ask for damages, and the court's disinclination
to contemplate anything more than disgorgement of the commissions, sug-
gests satisfaction with the terms of the transaction. I think it fair to say that
the case reflects the "real" if unstated rule applicable to corporate fiduciar-
ies; where disclosure is socially harmless, a fiduciary who fails to disclose
in advance of a conflicted transaction will be penalized, especially where
the plaintiff has entirely clean hands.13 As we will see, the fiduciary's loss
may be modest, depending on the behavior involved as well as the court's
ability, however ex post, to locate some damages or enrichment.14
This real rule for corporate fiduciaries can be translated into the lan-
guage of licensing, and comes with details worth examining, but it is useful
first to capture the flavor of this common law, albeit unarticulated, devel-
opment. There is some chance that Pablo and his associates might indeed
have bargained more aggressively or successfully if Pablo's own gain had
not depended on the goodwill of the sellers' agents. There is the more ob-
vious possibility that he would have proved a better bargainer if his likely
commission had not been positively related to the sale price. There is also
the possibility that he would not have recommended California real estate,
or these particular properties, if he had not expected personal income to
follow. All of these dangers might cause other shareholders to investigate
or delegate differently-and Pablo is obviously in the position to inform
them, and thereby warn them of these conflict-generated dangers, at ex-
tremely low cost. I suppose that an observer with great faith in ex post fact
finding might simply say that there is no gain from disclosure so long as the
corporation (or some set of beneficiaries who can overcome the obvious
collective action problem) is absolutely certain eventually to learn of
Pablo's commissions and, therefore, of its ability to sue and shift the burden
to Pablo to show that the transaction itself was fair. 5 "Fair" might be taken
to mean that Pablo must show that the price paid by the corporation would
not have been lower in the absence of his presence as a conflicted interme-
diary. But I suspect that most observers think such an insistence on the
ability of an ex post system to match or improve upon an ex ante warning
system is misguided. Pablo's fellow travelers might have relied on him less
had they known of his expectations regarding commissions. They might
have put more pressure on the sellers' agents to share commissions with
13 See infra note 22 and accompanying text (considering strategic delay).
14 In tam, even where there is no ready remedy, the prospect of damages in the event of price
changes and the like should serve to encourage disclosure by the fiduciary earlier in time. A skeptic
might say that this disclosure would be more likely if courts would articulate the "real" rule applicable
to corporate fiduciaries.
1s If the corporation might never learn of the conflict, then the fiduciary's liability can too easily be
understood as providing a kind of deterrence. Disclosure is needed because ex post monitoring or as-
sessment will sometimes fail to materialize and the fiduciary who knows of this possibility will be
tempted to encourage undesirable transactions (or, what is almost the same thing, corporations and other
principals will decline to delegate authority to agents and will therefore sacrifice gains from delegation).
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them, for instance by contributing to a deal at a lower sale price, if they had
known that these agents were so willing to split commissions with Pablo.
Moreover, I have assumed the inevitability of eventual disclosure or dis-
covery, but there is virtually always some uncertainty about that and, there-
fore, some gain associated with a rule that encourages ex ante disclosure.
What if Pablo had disclosed the fact that he expected a commission?
16
Licensing is much more than a disclosure requirement because license may
be denied; in corporate opportunity cases, for example, it is plain that a fi-
duciary who discloses an intention to pursue an opportunity that belongs to
the corporation is hardly protected from suit. Here, if Pablo discloses and
his principals consent and perhaps take steps to monitor or to replace him as
their negotiator, there remains an opportunity for ex post review so that the
license, which is to say the ex ante consent, is more a requirement or a
means of creating a rebuttable presumption than it is a safe harbor, or alter-
native means of regulation. But if the agent's disclosure yields hot consent
but objection by the principal, then new difficulties arise. I can find virtu-
ally no litigation or ruminations regarding these matters, perhaps because
agents tend to retreat in the face of sure litigation of this kind. Moreover,
retreat is no panacea.
Imagine first that the disclosure, objection, and retreat all occur before
the deal is completely done and the agent, Pablo, collects his commissions.
The fact of disclosure makes it very difficult for a court to award dam-
ages-and this may well suggest Pablo's best strategy-but the corporation
might fear that it has already suffered from its inability to send different ne-
gotiators or perceive correctly the available pie. And if the corporation ob-
jects and demands that Pablo forfeit any commissions should the negotiated
deal be consummated, it is not as if Pablo is likely to go back and renegoti-
ate a better deal for the corporation, because to do so would be to come
close to conceding an earlier bias. Pablo could be excluded from renego-
tiation, but this raises the interesting question of whether the corporation is
entitled to Pablo's unbiased services-which are now lost. Disclosure is
thus better when it is earlier, although it may be useful to point out that this
particular line of analysis has little to do with licensing more generally be-
cause most regulators gain little from earlier licensing applications. Some
regulators may resemble market participants, but most do not gain from
trade in the manner of most contractual partners and, if anything, they seem
more likely to benefit from last-minute rather than early, and more infor-
mative, licensing applications.
Early disclosure by Pablo followed by objection and retreat is perhaps
the least troublesome pattern. There may be some psychological wounds
16 1 am sliding over the question of whether this disclosure is with respect to the likelihood of com-
missions or extends to the details of the precise amount of the commission. See infra text accompanying
note 31 (noting that precise disclosure can convey too much information and that a call for "full disclo-
sure" leaves the discloser at some risk).
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that will need to heal or perhaps fester and affect future behavior, but the
situation is not much different from that of an agent whose responsibilities
are expanded and who uses the occasion to ask for increased compensation
but is then disappointed by her principal's response. There is the possibility
that the agent will shirk or that the principal will now try affirmatively to
reduce the agent's compensation (now that the principal sees that the agent
does not depart)-all of which might affect inclinations to disclose, object,
and retreat in the first place-but the ongoing struggle surrounding the
pooling of capital and skills and the value of uncovering reservation prices
should hardly be regarded either as a problem for law to resolve or as one
that law has caused. An interesting but remote possibility is that the re-
treating agent be able to sue the firm for damages. The idea is that the em-
ployer's objection may have been without legal basis but the reality is that
the employee can not collect for damages suffered as a result of his or her
own risk aversion. This is not a situation where the law is forced to rely on
suits for lost opportunities.
Disclosure followed by objection and then the failure of the agent or
the principal to retreat is perhaps the most interesting pattern in strategic
terms. It is not obvious that Pablo's employer can force him to negotiate
for the corporation and to forswear all commissions. Put more generally,
there are many cases where a fiduciary withdraws in order to avoid a con-
flict of interest, and there is then sometimes litigation about the fairness of
contracts such a fiduciary silently permitted to develop, but the fiduciary's
very withdrawal could be regarded as an actionable breach. As a practical
matter, this sort of conflict must often be resolved out of court if the parties
are to continue in their relationship, yet these resolutions are surely influ-
enced by perceptions of the background rule that the law would impose if
the matter were fully litigated. By way of illustration, imagine that an asso-
ciate or partner at a law firm has asked the firm for permission to work in a
weekend clinic in pro bono fashion. What if the firm objects, noting that
the clinic's location raises the remote possibility that a walk-in client will
have a dispute with a landlord who might be a future client of the firm, and
the lawyer proceeds-with full disclosure-to work in the clinic despite the
firm's objection? It is hard to imagine that the lawyer would ever be held
liable for the firm's losses if a conflict were to develop or if there were evi-
dence that a client was indeed lost because of a conflict between the clinic
and the firm. In a sense this may be because the firm has the option of
seeking to sever its relationship with the obstinate lawyer, but it is plain that
an inability to sue for damages shifts some power to the lawyer in bargain-
ing with the firm.17 The lawyer can of course also choose to sever the em-
ployment or partnership relationship, but the likelihood of such withdrawal
17 Without belaboring the point, it is possible that if courts recognized this subtle shift in bargaining
power, they might be less inclined to deny declaratory relief or more inclined to find that the attorney
had wronged the firm even if the attorney had disclosed.
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is greater if liability looms ahead. Nor is this apparent disinclination of the
law to entertain an ex post suit accompanied by a preference for an ex ante
suit, or legally infused licensing arrangement. It is possible and perhaps de-
sirable for the parties to have access to ex ante, injunctive specification of
their responsibilities. The lawyer and firm might both like to know whether
it is reasonable for the firm to demand that the lawyer avoid the clinic expe-
rience. Correspondingly, Pablo and his principals might all be happy to
proceed one way or the other if a court would tell them in advance whether
Pablo could retain the commissions that might come at no explicit cost to
the firm.
The sometime attraction of declaratory judgments is familiar and yet
usefully recalled. There are advantages to the certainty associated with
early-in-time determination of legal rights, but there are of course many
benefits associated with the usual preference for ex post adjudication. This
is probably not the place to theorize either about the optimal degree of de-
claratory relief or the extent to which the parties themselves should have the
option of determining when courts decide things early or late in time, al-
though it should be plain that these matters form a large part of the analysis
needed to answer the larger questions about licensing schemes. A simple
and optimistic perspective is that our system's preference for ex post re-
views is sensible. A more complex view is that there are so many settings
and ways in which parties-especially if they agree-can extract declaratory
interventions from courts,'" that it is difficult to say whether there is really
much of an uncertainty problem for Pablo and his principals should they
find themselves confronting one another at an early stage. In any event, it
is plain that there is an important link between some kinds of licensing and
arguments for declaratory adjudication. If declaratory relief is sometimes
attractive because it offers certainty, then licensing that protects successful
applicants against ex post second-guessing can do much the same. And if
declaratory relief is attractive in some settings because of the importance of
fresh facts or the elimination of ex post biases, then the value of a licensing
scheme is also likely to rise. But the corporate fiduciary context is not the
best place to pursue these general questions, if only because the contractual
nature of the arrangement, with a relatively small public interest compo-
nent, distracts from the licensing analogue. Consent between parties may
resemble some licensing by the state, but there is no need to take the extra
leap this analogy requires at the present time. For now, it is enough to see
the "real" rule of disclosure applicable to corporate fiduciaries as well as the
problems solved and created by such disclosure.
Is Alternatively, the parties may be able to extract declaratory and preemptive determinations from
legislatures or agencies.
93:709 (1999)
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B. Costly Disclosure
There are many cases like Pablo, by which I mean cases where the dis-
closure that is implicitly required would have been, at best, privately and
socially useful and, at worst, harmless though confrontational, and hardly
guaranteed to resolve all difficulties.1 9 But there are also cases where dis-
closure is more costly. Consider, for example, the well-worn Lincoln
Stores v. Grant.20 Grant, a director and manager at Lincoln Stores, was of-
fered the opportunity to take over nearby retail space that had been run by a
competitor of Lincoln Stores. He accepted this opportunity, but after Lin-
coln Stores learned the identity of its new competitor it objected and
claimed that this corporate opportunity should have been its to enjoy. There
are many interesting things to set aside here, including Lincoln Stores' dis-
inclination to expand some years earlier and Grant's continuing on their
payroll while secretly working on his new venture; the court decided that he
should disgorge the salary received during this "two-timing" period.2' I
also set aside a theme that I have developed elsewhere, that the outcome of
the case might have been determined by the probability that Lincoln Stores
seems to have strategically delayed in bringing its claim only after it be-
came clear that Grant's competing venture was profitable. 2
Another perspective on this case is not so much set aside here as it is
lightly folded into the analysis. Apparently the triggering event in the story
of Grant's departure from Lincoln Stores was a call from a real estate bro-
ker who approached Grant about the availability of the capital stock and lo-
cation of Lincoln Stores' competitor. But this intermediary could easily
have approached Lincoln Stores instead, or perhaps both Grant and Lincoln
Stores with the hope of stimulating a bidding contest between them. Evi-
dently, the broker thought either that Lincoln Stores itself was unlikely to
be interested in this opportunity or that it would value such an opportunity"G nt23 T
much less than would Grant. The significance of this feature of the case is
19 1 do not mean to minimize the private and social harm that confrontation can cause, but in order
to spare the reader additional categories, I adopt fairly conventional jargon.
20 34 N.E.2d 704 (Mass. 1941).
21 1 have simplified the facts. Grant was joined in the endeavor by others whose presence might
have made things worse for Grant, because the harm to Lincoln Stores might be seen as more serious
given that a significant number of their key people in one location turn out to have been distracted by
their new venture.
A factor explored in Saul Levnore, Strategic Delays and Fiduciary Duties, 74 VA. L. REV. 863
(1988).
23 As will become clear in the text, I am overstating the case somewhat, because the broker may
simply have thought that Grant would be more interested than would Lincoln Stores. Still, the basic
idea in the text is that the broker provides a kind of market check on the fiduciary and the principal.
This market check idea may play a role in a fair number of cases. Thus, in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164
N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928), perhaps the best-known fiduciary case of all, it is interesting that Cardozo is care-
ful to point out that the outsider, Gerry, did not know of Meinhard's existence. The idea, I think, is that
an informed outsider might have approached Meinhard instead of, or in addition to, making his overture
to Salmon. Conversely, had the outsider known of the partner, which is to say of Meinhard's existence,
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that the fiduciary has not wrongfully usurped if the corporation-with no
knowledge of the fiduciary's success or even of the fiduciary's desire to
embark on this adventure-would not have invested in the opportunity in
question. And even if the corporation would have pursued the opportunity
but the fiduciary attaches much greater value to it, there is an argument to
be made against allowing the corporation to block the fiduciary's defection
and against a decision that imposes a constructive trust on the usurped op-
portunity in favor of the corporation, whose true damages are after all rela-
tively small.24 The fact that the outsider and its broker-who had almost
everything to gain from approaching Lincoln Stores--.did not approach
Lincoln Stores thus bolsters Grant's implicit or best claim that Lincoln
Stores is only complaining now that it sees Grant's success in the compet-
ing venture or, more interestingly but less dramatically, now that it knows
that only by taking the opportunity could it hope to retain Grant and his
fellow adventurers as valued employees.Y
Lincoln Stores fails in its bid to have the court impose a constructive
trust with respect to Grant's venture and yet it would seem that the "real"
rule, as I have claimed it for corporate fiduciaries, requires disclosure by
Grant. In the absence of such upfront disclosure, trusting readers had rea-
son to expect a decision against Grant on the'constructive trust claim. But
the difference between Pablo and Lincoln Stores is that in the latter case
disclosure is not just the tip of a problematic iceberg, as it appeared to be in
Pablo, especially when it is followed by objection and a refusal of the agent
to retreat. In contrast, in Lincoln Stores disclosure is affirmatively costly or
harmful. Unfortunately, this conclusion or intuition is not straightforward.
One way to think about it is to identify the legal system's default rule re-
garding behavior in the absence of an explicit noncompetition agreement.
A related method may be to tinker with the chronology of disclosure and
confrontation. The critical 'assumption, I think, is that Lincoln Stores may
have a claim on an opportunity it would have pursued (within its line of
business) but it has no such claim on Grant's future services; Grant can de-
part as he likes, absent some specific and enforceable agreement to the
contrary.
Imagine first that Grant discloses the approach of the outside broker
and signals his intention to seize the moment and to depart. If his em-
ployer, Lincoln Stores, throws a friendly farewell party, then the firm is re-
garded as consenting to the fiduciary's departure, declining the opportunity
and then still approached Salmon alone, I think-and more important, I think that Cardozo
thought-Salmon would then have an implicit defense, namely that the outsider had every reason to ap-
proach Meinhard, and if the outsider did not do so then we have some objective market evidence that
this was not an opportunity Meinhard would have taken.
24 1 leave this suggestion about "mild usurpations" for another day.
25I am assuming-with no explicit legal authority-that a corporation can not claim an opportunity
in order not to lose the valuable services of a fiduciary. Where the fiduciary has the right to depart and
compete, the right does not evaporate simply because the employer wishes to defeat that right.
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itself, or simply conceding that the opportunity is not the firm's to exploit.
If instead Lincoln Stores reacts to Grant's disclosure by objecting to his be-
havior and plans, and Grant chooses not to retreat, there is the threat of
some'social harm.2 6 Lincoln Stores may use its newly acquired information
to try and buy the competitor's stock or site, or it may even attempt to tar-
nish Grant's reputation with suppliers. These kinds of obstacles may dis-
courage Grant. In the long run employees such as Grant may be less
inclined to venture out on their own or even be discouraged from entering
this kind of industry or work for a large employer. The legal system makes
this kind of judgment about competition and mobility in many small ways,
and I think there can be no doubt but that the inclination of our legal system
is to make it fairly easy for employees to depart and compete.2 7
Alternative judgments are possible. One might for example tip the
balance more than we do toward encouraging employers to invest in their
employees' human capital. And, of course, employers can to some degree
enter into specific contractual arrangements with employees or potential
employees before investing in them. A rule that penalizes nondisclosure by
Grant-even where it is plausible or likely that a court would eventually
find that the opportunity was not one which the employer could prevent the
employee or fiduciary from pursuing-would be at least mildly surprising
because the affect it would have on employees seems in conflict with other
pieces of our legal system. Indeed, it is plausible that it is the overreaching
employer, such as Lincoln Stores (hypothetically), that needs to be con-
cerned about confrontation. Imagine, for example, that Grant discloses his
plans to his employer but indicates that this disclosure is confidential. He
26 If Grant discloses, his employer objects, and Grant then chooses to retreat, the social harm is
much like that presently described in the text. Grant's retreat may reflect fear as to the costs of litiga-
tion, reputational losses, and other matters, but these considerations are quite similar to those we must
take into account in thinking about the situation where he chooses not to retreat, and Lincoln Stores then
presses a claim.
27 An employee's ability to leave a firm and compete with that firm often becomes a legal issue
when the safety of trade secrets are at issue. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1993). Although the competing interests of the firm and the employee are both
legitimate, courts will give substantial weight to the rights of an employee to leave and pursue her liveli-
hood, free from the restrictions of prior employment See SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d
1244, 1264 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430,433 (Pa. 1960)); American Can
Co. v Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314,329 (7th Cir. 1984); Wexler, 160 A.2d at 433; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 Reporter's Note cmt. b. For a view of the skepticism of the courts re-
garding these employment contracts, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection
and the Mobility of Management Employees: A New Problem For the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659, 664-72
(1996) (noting that courts are generally skeptical of employment contracts that reduce an employee's
mobility and will impose a reasonableness test on such contracts); see also AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker,
823 F.2d 1199, 1201-03 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding trade secrecy restriction against a managerial employee
unenforceable, in part, because the agreement was both unlimited in duration and geography and was
therefore unreasonable); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990) (finding em-
ployer's agreement not to compete unreasonable and therefore unenforceable because it was not neces-
sary to protect business interests).
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might say that his aim is to make things as easy as possible for this em-
ployer, who will need to find new employees, adjust its advertising, and so
forth. Alternatively, he might say that his disclosure is meant to offer them
the opportunity to litigate (or turn to some form of dispute resolution) as
early as possible if they disagree that this opportunity is one which Grant
ought to be able to pursue on his own. Either way, if Lincoln Stores now
places any hurdles in Grant's way, as for example by bidding on the com-
petitor's stock or property which Grant plans to acquire, then it is possible
that Grant would have a claim against Lincoln Stores. The claim is a bit
difficult to categorize. It might stand as a kind of fiduciary claim itself, al-
though we do not normally conceive of fiduciary relationships as bilateral
in this manner. Alternatively, the claim might amount to an allegation of
unfair competition, or perhaps as one which gives new life to the doctrinal
category of tortious interference with contract.
Unfortunately, I can hardly claim that Lincoln Stores stands as an ex-
ample of this idea that the rule I have suggested, requiring disclosure by fi-
duciaries even where conventional doctrine announces that they are simply
subject to ex post judgments about the fairness of bargains, is in fact a re-
fined rule which imposes a disclosure requirement-but only where the dis-
closure itself is socially harmless. After all, I also suggested that strategic
delay may play an important role in the case, and there is no reason to think
that disclosure considerations need to trump strategic delay2 8 There are
simply too few cases to control for this variable and thus not enough evi-
dence for me to insist on the positive value of this distinction between
harmless and potentially harmful disclosure. For the present, I aim only to
encourage the idea that the conventional rule may have fooled us, and po-
tential litigants, into looking in the wrong place. Once we focus on disclo-
sure and the problems it solves-but also (or especially) those
confrontations and consequences it generates-we may find many more
cases which permit a fair assessment of the possible exception for costly
disclosure. Moreover, a refined rule may be quite likely to develop, even if
there is none at present, once parties know to argue that their cases can be
distinguished from precedents because of the likely harm generated by a
rule that penalizes all nondisclosure.
C. Intermediate Disclosure
Returning to the Pablo case, what if Pablo had disclosed the likelihood
of a kickback, or shared commission, but not its magnitude? More infor-
mation seems better than less, although it does create more opportunities to
28 I would, however, expect disclosure to trump the idea that alleged usurpers or their opponents, for
that matter, are more likely to win if they can show some market evidence of their claim. See supra
notes 23-25 and accompanying text. This is because the market check idea goes directly to the question
of whether there is likely to be a wrongfully taken opportunity and that is the question that disclosure
might have avoided or accelerated.
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litigate over the accuracy and precision of disclosure. In other cases, how-
ever, more precise disclosure is at least distorting and possibly harmful. In
Robinson v. Brier,2 9 a director of a company that manufactured luggage had
a more substantial interest in another company that manufactured frames.
The second company was able to produce and sell these frames to the first
firm at a lower price than had a previous supplier. The conflicted director
was open about his interest in this inter-firm transaction and the court re-
jected the claim that he should have disclosed the second company's costs
of production. The case may turn on plaintiff's delay in bringing a claim,
but the issue of disclosing costs or even profits arises in many other cases
and even forms the stuff of a category in the American Law Institute's Cor-
porate Governance project, where some jurisdictions are said to require dis-
closure of material facts, others to require no disclosure (but rather
fairness), and then others to require disclosure of profit.30
There are settings where precise disclosure, including information
about costs and profits, seems important if only because startling profit data
may signal a principal that additional monitoring or inquiry is wise. But in
other settings the requirement that a supplier reveal cost data or its equiva-
lent may deter that supplier from contracting with the firm, to the long-run
detriment of the "protected" firm, because the information may become
known to other firms,31 may distort the firm's decision as to whether to deal
with this firm or another (unrelated) firm, and may present opportunities for
undue mischief associated with litigation over the details of what has been
disclosed. A court that seeks to explain a decision against a fiduciary might
(nearly) always be able to find some detail that was not disclosed and that
might have affected another party's behavior. Moreover, in some cases dis-
closure of the details might well provide the firm with more information
than it could expect from a non-conflicted competing supplier-but such
disclosure might simply balance the information that the conflicted party
has about both firms. In Brier, for instance, other suppliers surely need not
convey information about their production costs so that if Brier's frame-
making firm needed to do so, the luggage manufacturer would enjoy a bar-
gaining advantage. On the other hand, Brier himself was privy to informa-
tion about the luggage manufacturer and was therefore advantaged
compared to his competitors in the frame-making business. Seemingly ex-
cessive disclosure might therefore level the playing field. There is obvi-
ously a great deal that could be said here, but in the interest of persevering
with questions more closely related to licensing schemes quite generally it
29 194 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1963).
30 See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE §§ 1.14 (Disclosure), 1.25 (Material Facts), 5.02 (Trans-
actions With The Corporation) (1994) (collecting state statutes and cases and indicating that only a mi-
nority of states find the profit earned in transactions with a corporation to be a material fact that a
reasonable person would consider important under the circumstances).
31 If the information could be kept confidential, then at least in theory the supplier should be willing
to contract at its reservation price where it earns a tiny profit.
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should be sufficient to note that we might expect some variety in these deci-
sions. It is as least possible to describe "full" disclosure as likely often to
be socially harmful. I am tempted to suggest that in a case like Pablo full
disclosure will be required, in one like Brier partial disclosure will be the
rule, and in cases like Lincoln Stores no disclosure will be encouraged (be-
cause any disclosure might lead he employer to behave in a way that gener-
ated more social harm than good). There is enough evidence to make
something of a run at this theory, but because it suffers-as do many opti-
mistic positive theories-from the problem of determining the optimum de-
gree of complexity, or number of categories and refinements, in the law, it
is perhaps best left for more eager readers.
I hesitate, however, to depart from this area of law without reinforcing
some of the doctrinal conjectures. As we have seen, it may be accurate to
describe the law as requiring disclosure, and sometimes partial disclosure,
because (or where) such disclosure is often useful and not socially harmful.
Doctrinal claims regarding the exclusive importance of fairness, or arm's
length pricing, seem much less accurate than this one based on disclosure.
Moreover, doctrinal claims about disclosure rules across jurisdictions seem
unsubstantiated and less promising than the conjecture offered here, that
disclosure requirements vary depending on the social utility of disclosure,
including assessments of the gains and losses from full disclosure of such
things as costs and profits. It may even be that there is little gained from
the conventional assignment, or bifurcation, of cases into doctrinal catego-
ries associated with the labels of self-dealing and corporate opportunity.
Pablo can be seen as a corporate opportunity case, although it is normally
described as of the self dealing, two-hatted kind, Lincoln Stores has more
than an element of self-dealing to it, although it is displayed as a corporate
opportunity case, and so forth. We may see these stories in the law more
clearly if we think of them all in terms of the degree of disclosure that is
usefully required. To be sure, in some instances the remedies that are
sought will differ depending on whether the fiduciary invested in competing
property, but it is noteworthy that in these two cases the remedies that are
sought are virtually identical, and can be described as in the disgorgement,
or constructive trust, family. The difference in outcomes would seem to
have everything to do with the desirability of disclosure.
D. Disclosure Requirements and Licensing More Generally
It is tempting to draw additional and immediate conclusions about cor-
porate law, and even to generalize about the advantages of encouraging or
forcing early disclosure-even if it be partial disclosure or mere signal-
ing-in other settings as well. I have already implied that at least in some
parts of corporate law, courts can be seen as having imposed a kind of li-
censing requirement on fiduciaries. Granted, this requirement admits of
some exceptions, leaves room for other variables, and assesses noncompli-
ance penalties that are often lower than the damages that would be due in an
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ex post system.32 As we will see, such modest penalties for nondisclosure,
or for the failure to be properly licensed, are attractive. However, they tend
to ensure that the upfront system will not replace an ex post system, but will
accompany it and generate additional administrative and compliance costs.
But all these matters need to be revisited with more comparative informa-
tion in hand.
For the present, my aim in this Part has been to revisit this (seemingly)
self-contained area of corporate law and to show that there is more here
than first meets the eye. The conventional statement of the law focuses on
ex post determination of arm's length bargains but the real rule may have
much more to do with disclosure. And the disclosure "rule" itself may be
sensitive both to the question of whether disclosure threatens to undo the
system's judgment about employee mobility and to the question of whether
in the particular case disclosure might cause other harms. Finally, disclo-
sure seems to create as many interesting problems as it solves. Hornbook
and case law seem to anticipate that disclosure brings about a response that
puts an end to the matter. But, as we have seen, if disclosure is followed by
confrontation, a variety of complexities may follow. In this sense a disclo-
sure requirement is something much less than-and perhaps more trouble-
some than-a conventional licensing requirement because in a public
33
licensing system there is a kind of adjudication rather than mere confronta-
tion. To be sure, a disclosure scheme of the kind described here could be
developed into something very similar to a licensing regime by allowing
parties to head for adjudication as soon as they perceive some uncertainty in
the application of a legal rule or their own contractual formulations. One
obvious path to pursue here is the analogy to, or utility of, fast-track li-
censing options, but I will let the present analysis stand on its own.
Im. DISCLOSuRE AND UNBIASED DECISIONMAKING IN THE LAW OF
SEARCH WARRANTS
A. Murray and Beyond
Murray v. United States3 4 is a Fourth Amendment case about the inde-
pendent source doctrine. 35  The case involves the warrantless search of a
32 Indeed, in some cases this judicially constructed licensing scheme flies in the face of fairly ex-
plicit legislative instructions as to safe harbors and the like. See infra note 11.
33 I refer here to another difference between conventional licensing and that found in corporate law,
namely that the parties may find it much easier to contract out of the requirements attached by judges to
"private" arrangements than out of legislated, or "public," licensing schemes.
34 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
35 The Court in Murray observed:
Almost simultaneously with our development of the exclusionary rule, in the first quarter of this
century, we also announced what has come to be known as the independent source doctrine...
[that] the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having
juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the
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warehouse that had been under surveillance. The illicit search revealed a
large store of contraband; the police exited and sought a warrant-without
disclosing to the magistrate that they had already entered the premises and
seen the evidence they now sought. Armed with the warrant, the police re-
entered the warehouse and seized the evidence that the defendant then
sought to have excluded. The government's argument was that the police
were on their way to seeking a search warrant prior to the first search, and
that given the quality of the information they had at that time, a warrant
would have been granted. Citizens who are unfamiliar with modem Fourth
Amendment law are often astonished to learn that the Murray Court held
that the evidence was admissible.
My present interest in Fourth Amendment law is obviously premised
on a characterization of a search warrant as a license. Most licensing
schemes call upon private parties to ask the government for permission to
engage in some activity. I have already suggested that in thinking about the
wisdom and consequences of the failure to obtain such consent, we might
benefit from exploring the relationship to disclosure rules and consent
practices in settings that are more private, or contractual, where private par-
36
ties might ask one another for permissions. In the search warrant setting,
the government is involved-but now it is the government that is in search
of a license, from an affected private party or from another branch of the
government.37 I will not bother to characterize this as a third kind of li-
censing scheme, in which case the law of waivers might form a fourth, be-
cause my aim here is to show common elements of licensing schemes,
defined broadly, rather than available distinctions.
In many ways search warrants are conventional licenses. Here, as in
other licensing settings, one who proceeds without a license is sometimes
bound for legal trouble, sometimes merely inconvenienced, and sometimes
under no disadvantage at all-as when no license is required by the courts.
Similarly, while it is easy to complain about the courts' deference to police,
even where it is easy for the police to make false claims about the behavior
same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had oc-
curred .... When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence
would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or viola-
tion.
487 U.S. at 537 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,443 (1984)).
36 In these settings, licensing is normally between private parties even though background rights and
enforcement strategies are set by legislatures and courts.
37 If our law were more like German law, imposing stricter requirements on private parties who
"search" or invade other private premises than it does on government agents, then the comparison be-
tween warrants and licenses would be quite direct, with the government regulating private transactions
upfront rather than simply enabling these parties to sue one another in tort or some comparable outcome-
based system that sought to control the extent and character of searches. See Craig M. Bradley, The Ex-
clusionary Rule In Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1048 (1983) (comparing the German exclusionary
rule to the American rule); see also Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus As To
Criminal Procedure Rule, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 171,206-17 (1993) (discussing the German exclusionary
rule).
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they observed before proceeding to search without warrants and without
supervision, the licensing label reminds us that such deference is quite
common. We expect deference to health inspectors and most examiners
even where we have little more than an examiner's word pitted against that
of a complaining citizen, and even though the examiner might gain person-
ally from occasional dishonesty. 8
Taken as much out of context as seems reasonable, Murray might be
described as a case in which the failure to obtain a license in timely fashion
did not preclude the applicant from applying later for the license-with no
disclosure of the earlier failure to obtain the license-just in time to elude
the system's enforcement tool. One is tempted to imagine an unlicensed
driver pulling over to the side of a highway in sight of an upcoming police
checkpoint, running across the road to a state office building in order to
obtain or validate a driver's license, and then proceeding through the
checkpoint.39
My present, more specific interest in Murray begins with what might
be a disadvantage of disclosure, namely the possibility that the magistrate's
decision is superior if it is unbiased either against the police, by knowledge
of the prior unlicensed search, or in their favor, perhaps by knowledge of
what the police have already seen in the targeted warehouse. In Murray, it
is tempting to think of the government as having done its best to re-create
the original licensing application that it wishes it had completed. And there
is something to be said for this strategy of making the best of an earlier
permission "slip" by disclosing less rather than more when trying to undo
the earlier harm or start over again with the original request. The idea that
less information can generate better, unbiased decisionmaking is not star-
tling. An artist who wants an honest assessment of a piece he or she has
created may dissemble as to the identity of the creator or may engage a third
party to bring the piece to a professional appraiser.40 Anonymity is a fa-
miliar tool in contests.41 In short, Murray could have been about one very
particular aspect of licensing, namely the best strategy for ex post, or at
38 It goes almost without saying that it would be impossible to manage a policing and criminal jus-
tice system that did not rely on the honesty of field officers. Most licensing systems will find it much
easier to review the work of line officers.
39 Note that in both the search warrant and driver's license settings, the system could provide-as
many life insurance and university applications do-that the applicant must disclose any previous appli-
cations or rejections. Affirmative responses might trigger increased review or might virtually preclude
the grant of what is requested. In some settings there may be an undesirable spirit of self-incrimination,
and more generally there is the question of what to do or to expect when an applicant misdiscloses or
refuses to disclose but otherwise seems qualified.
40 A professional appraiser is less likely than a friend to be offended by the prospect of denigrating a
piece that turned out to have been created by the person who submits the piece for inspection.
41 I am not suggesting that the application for a search warrant be anonymous. Rather, anonymity is
but one example of the withholding of information in order to elicit an unbiased judgment. Another fa-
miliar reason why less information may be better than more is that decisionmakers may have difficulty
processing the information. This comes closer to the possibility claimed in the text.
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least late in time, re-creation of the licensing process. An applicant who se-
cures permission late in time can sometimes argue thatno harm was done
by the failure to obtain a license at an earlier moment. Note, in passing,
that although there may sometimes be social gain associated with the failure
to obtain the original warrant, or license, as was arguably the case in some
of the corporate cases discussed earlier, the question about remedying the
failure to obtain a license at the first and best opportunity is one worth pur-
suing even where early disclosure is harmless or beneficial.
Unfortunately, Murray is provocative but not terribly supportive of the
view encouraged here regarding the re-creation of a licensing application
with purposeful nondisclosure. Such support might, for example, have
come in the form of a statement by the Court, or decisions to this effect by
later courts, that critical to the decision in the government's favor was the
withholding of information from the magistrate.4 2 If instead the magistrate
had issued the warrant after being told the truth about the earlier search, it
would be nice to know that the Court would have suppressed the evidence,
or at least insisted that the likely biases accompanying information might
offset one another in the magistrate's mind. But most of this is fantasy;
there is every reason to think that the Court would have allowed the evi-
dence in Murray even, or especially, if the magistrate had been told the
truth about the earlier search. In any event, subsequent case law develop-
ments give not a hint of the idea that-as a predictive or positive matter-
less information is ever regarded as better than more in the magistrate's
hands.
Murray offers an opportunity to see the potential returns from thinking
about diverse licensing questions as of one piece. In many licensing
schemes, a specific penalty attaches to a failure to secure a license. We
might think of this as an approach utilizing dual or bifurcated remedies, al-
though there is the recurring question of whether the second remedy will be
independent of the presence or imposition of the first. The presence of dual
remedies or incentives buttresses arguments against increasing the second
penalty simply because there was unlicensed activity. If, for example,
someone drives a motor vehicle without a license and is involved in an ac-
42 The majority in Murray says that its decision does not encourage illegal first searches because the
gains from going without a warrant application are overcome by the cost to the police of having to con-
vince the trial court later on that no information gained from the illegal entry affected either the decision
to seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant it. I think the decision could have relied on the
stronger position that the evidence is admissible even if it completely affected the decision to seek a
warrant (whereas in Murray the police claim that they went in to see if there were criminals inside and
to protect against evidence destruction). The argument would then be that Murray re-creates an unbi-
ased decision and that "search first, warrant later" is still discouraged either by the fact that the police
know that they are repeat players who must worry about being distrusted or by the possibility that the
trial court will lean toward harsh rulings because of its suspicions that the police did not unintentionally
"slip." In any event, we have before us the easier case where the government asks only for the rule that
where the police honestly slipped in thinking that the first entry was acceptable, they gain something by
retreating and securing a warrant before marching in to seize the evidence.
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cident in a manner which suggests that the failure to secure the license was
not a proximate cause of the accident, then the argument against liability for
the unlicensed driver is not parried by the claim that exoneration in the tort
suit will encourage unlicensed driving. After all, by hypothesis, the "dupli-
cative" regulatory scheme comes with its own penalty, which attaches when
unlicensed drivers are stopped either because of accidents or for other rea-
sons. There seems to be more of an argument for increasing the outcome-
driven remedy when there is no separate remedy for failure at the input
stage. This is especially, or perhaps only, true when the point of the li-
censing scheme is something more than the prevention of accidents.43
The coexistence of single and dual systems can be revealing. Con-
sider, for example, that in the case of driving, commonly deployed upfront
penalties may help monitor and record activities. Driving without a license,
failing a driving or vision exam, and driving in a manner that violates a "li-
censing" or regulatory scheme, are all more likely to be recorded if the state
has an incentive, in the form of a fine it can collect, to monitor vehicles and
cite drivers for these violations. In turn, private insurers can use this infor-
mation in setting rates and in excluding drivers or vehicles from the road.
Put differently, if this is not the point of the dual system, then it is hard to
see why we do not simply require insurance, as most jurisdictions already
do, and then allow the insurance market to decide everything that is now set
or ignored by statute and regulation.44
By way of comparison, there is rarely a penalty for unwarranted house
searches other than that provided at the outcome stage by the exclusionary
rule. Unlicensed searches of the innocent generally yield no remedy.45 But
what is the connection between the absence of insurance for an unwarranted
and unwanted search, not to mention the unavailability of liability insurance
for illicit searchers, and the absence of a specific and separate penalty for
the failure to obtain a license to search? It seems that there is less benefit
from duplication where there is no insurance because now there is no user
who seeks information in order to differentiate among applicants for insur-
ance. And this intuition seems useful in explaining why driving is regulated
by a dual system, while searches are regulated by a single, outcome-
43 If the idea is simply to prevent accidents, there may be no need to pile on to the conventional out-
come system. But if the upfront, licensing scheme aims also to control congestion or to educate citizens
about other matters, such as child safety seats, for example, then the dual remedies are not simply dupli-
cative.
44 But this sort ofprivatization of licensing is a subject best left for another effort.
45 There are of course very occasional and much publicized cases where there is some remedy or
settlement value, but by and large even the innocent do not collect for unwarranted searches. See Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 899-906 (1990) (dis-
cussing the difficulties of measuring actual damages caused by illegal searches, in particular the
difficulties with measurement of intangible damages, and noting that tangible damages will often be less
than $100 even if measurable). An illustrative case is Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558, 563 (2d
Cir. 1991) (awarding victims of an illegal search $1 in nominal damages because victims failed to prove
consequential damages).
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oriented system. I will not go so far as to claim that insurance will or
should always accompany a dual system, if only because most insurance
markets will not need such strong-form assistance from the government in
monitoring and recording behavior patterns after the fact. But where there
is no insurance we might be especially wary of dual systems, which may
serve the needs of interest groups in a manner that is not socially efficient.4
Murray is as good a vehicle as any for thinking about a benefit of near-
duplication. The awkwardness-or political difficulty or unfairness-of the
exclusionary rule has something to do with the distance, whether described
chronologically or morally, between the wrong that is addressed and the
remedy that is eventually imposed. Of equal relevance is the fact that the
remedy advantages a set of persons that does not include those innocents
whom we might think of as most deserving of protection from illicit
searches. One way to remove these thorns is to develop a separate, lesser
remedy for illegal searches. Indeed, a large number of problems in this and
other licensing areas can be avoided, if that it a fair word, by adding a rem-
edy. Additional tools often enable a coherent incentive system to appeal to
conceptions of fairness and refinement. The idea is that observers may be
more comfortable with a range of penalties so that all wrongdoers face
some palpable sanction. In Murray itself, if the wrongful first search had
triggered a fine or other remedy, the admissibility of the evidence that was
eventually seized would seem less jarring if only because every observer
would then recognize that illicit searches are discouraged by the extant legal
rules. Economists tend to appreciate remedies based on their expected val-
ues, but other observers and many courts appear to abide by the intuition
that, where feasible, wrongful behavior should be penalized each time it oc-
curs-and according to some conception of proportionality. This observa-
tion hardly explains the presence of licensing systems; we could for
example require no warrants but exclude evidence later on when it is deter-
mined ex post that an earlier search was wrongful.47 But once a licensing
requirement is taken as a given, the observation does illuminate the practice
of imposing separate penalties for violations of that requirement even
though it would be possible to calibrate the single, later remedy alone.
4 And, no doubt, some will argue that this is the case for privatization quite generally. I plan to
return to the question of interest group influences and private "regulation" in a future article.
47 And as for the problem of encouraging wrongful searches, see supra note 42 and observe that
even in a single case like Murray, the police may not want to "search first, ask later" because they may
fear that if they search without a warrant, then a court will be too strict in its application of the inde-
pendent source doctrine and will "overestimate" the degree to which the first search is what really gave
the police the information that generated the later warrant request. Alternatively, and following the nar-
rower doctrine of the case, a court may insist that the police would not have asked for a warrant if they
had not seen contraband the first time. The Court's claim in this regard is stronger when it really be-
lieves--or limits the case's applicability to situations where-the police are already on their way to get a
warrant when they go have a peek.
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In the search warrant setting, there is no shortage of explanations for
the licensing requirement. Thus, the warrant process serves a role in forc-
ing police to specify in advance what it is they are looking or and where it
is that they plan to search. These substantive constraints might control un-
desirable searches because in the absence of a warrant process it might be
too easy for the police to "specify" after the search what it was they were
looking for and where they planned to search. The outcome in Murray
might be explained in large part by the fact that in that particular case there
was little danger of manufacturing such ex post specification because the
evidence was in plain view once the police were inside the warehouse. Hy-
pothetically, if the police had been drug investigators and had they claimed
to have been looking all along for some stolen art that was actually found in
a warehouse they entered with no warrant, prior to requesting a warrant
with no disclosure of the earlier entry, the courts might have developed a
rule more sensitive to the problem of ex post specification.
In the search warrant setting, it is also possible to identify costs associ-
ated with more disclosure or licensing. Some of these costs are so obvious
that no license is required, as when the police are chasing a dangerous
criminal who runs into a private house. Taking up the point developed in
Section 11-B, that law might reflect sensitivity to the possibility of socially
harmful disclosure, there is even a claim to be made that the evolution of
the law of search warrants can be understood in these terms. The licensing
requirement has been systematically relaxed through deference to law en-
forcement personnel and the development of good-faith exceptions. This
might be associated with some recognition that a public licensing require-
ment often generates costs, if only because the licensing process can inform
targets of upcoming searches, allowing them to take evasive steps. s More
generally, the trends in search warrant law might be seen as one of many
concurrent examples of deregulation, which can itself be seen as the product
of either the rise and fall of various political interest groups or the growing
recognition of the costs of regulation.
In any event, this particular explanation for licensing in Fourth
Amendment law, relating as it does to the advantage of requiring ex ante
specification, has nothing to do with the one, relating to insurance markets,
advanced with respect to drivers' licenses. In both cases numerous other
explanations are available. In these and many other cases, whatever the
reasons for the dual regulatory system, dual remedies may be something of
a luxury from an economist's point of view. If this is correct, the presence
of a separate, severable, lesser remedy for an upfront violation may be hard
4s Another interesting cost is that targets may have their reputations damaged because of the public-
ity surrounding a search or even the request for a warrant. But this cost might suggest either a more or
less stringent warrant requirement; more in order to reduce the number of such events but less in order to
avoid the publicity associated with the warrant request. In any event, it is likely that the optimal licens-
ing requirement is different in different contexts because of the predictable but varying private and so-
cial costs associated with warrants.
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to predict. I can imagine the appearance of new, modest remedies for ille-
gal searches, but I can also imagine jurisdictions not bound by our Consti-
tution with no warrant requirement and with purely ex post remedies for
illegal searches. Similarly, we can imagine severe penalties for unlicensed
driving, virtually unrelated to the question of whether any accidents oc-
curred, but we can also imagine a variety of deregulation, nearly total reli-
ance on a tort system, and perhaps a rule of mandatory insurance, with
insurers then "licensing" drivers.49
B. Small Puzzles in a Slightly New Light
Imagine that someone grabs a candy bar from a store, is nabbed by a
police officer upon exiting the premises, and then returns to the store where
he reveals nothing of his earlier act and sweetly asks the owner if he can
have the candy bar without charge inasmuch as he is hungry and without
money in hand. Setting aside the practical problem of prosecuting without
the owner's cooperation, we would hardly allow the perpetrator to claim
that if the owner now consents then the spirit of Murray calls for exonera-
tion.50
One way to think about this is to see a resemblance to the case of an
unlicensed driver stopped at a roadblock who offers to apply for a license at
this late time.5' Another is that in the shoplifting case, unlike Murray, the
availability of ex post permission would almost surely encourage illicit ear-
lier behavior, recognizing that the label "illicit" presumes a willingness to
abide by the legislative or other decision to require the license in the first52
place. This perspective, in turn, points to the thin line between wrongful,
49 I am coming too close to the "uniformity and variety" theme I have tried to advance in compara-
tive law.
so An alternative version of the hypothetical in the text has the shop owner informed of the earlier
wrong before giving ex post permission. I begin, however, with a version that tracks Murray as closely
as possible.
51 A similar and perhaps familiar case is that of a student who uses an unauthorized extra hour to
complete a self-scheduled examination-but then obtains ex post permission without revealing that he
has already finished the exam. The student's behavior seems worse than the shoplifter's, and I think it is
because the student plans to say nothing if permission is denied; the instructor will normally have no
way of knowing that the misdeed has already occurred. If the student voluntarily approaches an admin-
istrator, confesses the use of extra time, and suggests that he seek ex post permission, agreeing that if it
is denied a substantial penalty is in order but that if permission is given the misdeed should be excused,
then I think the student looks better than the shoplifter who has not voluntarily come forward.
52 If the licensing requirement is seen as inappropriate, then many observers will want to forgive the
failure to obtain a license. Even if the requirement is sensible, but thought to serve little purpose of its
own other than as a proxy for some other screening device or guarantee about outcomes, many observers
will quickly forgive earlier failures. Thus, a school that "requires" a standardized exam as part of its
admissions process may not only choose to accept an applicant whose fabulous record does not include
sitting for that exam but also may choose not to rusticate a student who turns out to have received a good
score in error (or perhaps even by fraud) but who subsequently performs extremely well in the school
itself. The example is interesting only if a similar student whose post-admission performance were me-
diocre would be excluded because of the earlier "failure." Somewhat similarly, I will avoid examples
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antisocial behavior and the failure to obtain a license. A large number of
wrongs can be characterized as the failure to obtain permission; theft is the
unauthorized use of another's property, assault is a nonconsensual touching,
and so forth. But I think the line can be thickened by recognizing that
where we guess that permission would have been most unlikely to have
been granted if requested, we are especially disinclined to accept ex-post re-
creations of licensing applications because we fear the costs. If we then add
in the idea that it is difficult to set the optimal level of separate, upfront
penalties for the failure to obtain a license, we have something of a theory
as to when and where ex post permission can play some role. By way of
illustration, we do not think shop owners would often give away free goods
and we .do not imagine most people consenting to being touched by strang-
ers and, therefore, we do not accept or encourage ex post re-creations of the
permission process. We may be unable to penalize the unlicensed actor as
we like, because testimony of another party is required, but our moral and
legal intuitions are to stick to the plan reflected in the licensing requirement.
If we were confident about our ability to set fines or other penalties for the
failure to seek consent alone, we might structure the system in a different
fashion. Indeed, we might feel free to deploy a single remedy that was ei-
ther upfront-licensing based-or after the fact-outcome-based.5 3 In con-
trast, we are quite certain that permission for a search in Murray would
have been granted. A slightly different perspective on this point is that in a
case like Murray the availability of ex post permission is unlikely to en-
courage warrantless searches both because it is easy for the police to obtain
advance permission and because they might fear that if they become repeat
offenders with regard to the warrant requirement, courts will often deny
them ex post and ex ante permission. In the case of the shoplifted candy
bar, there is a danger that the strategic criminal will take and then later ask
permission-and if permission is denied he will say nothing about the theft.
If this plan works, which is to say in settings where the request for permis-
sion does not draw attention to the theft, the availability of ex post permis-
sion may well encourage theft.
This approach, which can be associated with conventional wisdom
about constructing optimal default rules where parties could bargain at
some cost, is also revealing in the identification of hard cases. There is the
familiar case of the insured who files a claim and is then discovered to have
erred or misrepresented some fact on the original application for coverage.
The more we are uncertain whether insurance would have been offered or
whether at a higher premium most applicants would have gone ahead with
such as that posed by the unlicensed gun-owner who kills in self-defense, because sentiments and actual
legal results are likely to have more to do with preexisting views of the licensing rules themselves.
53 Here the outcome system would penalize the actor who offended the victim, but it would exoner-
ate a perpetrator who obtained permission from the other party after the fact. The upfront system would
impose (presumably) a slightly lesser penalty on all who proceeded without license.
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the purchase of the insurance,54 the harder the case. An overdetermined but
relevant set of examples is where one has "caused" harm after practicing a
profession, such as medicine, or even operating a motor vehicle, without a
license. If the practitioner could not have obtained a license or would likely
have emerged from the licensing process with improved skills, then we are
tempted to expect the failure to obtain a license to play a larger role in the
imposition of liability than where the practitioner simply allowed a license
to lapse.
I may be making too much of this point about reconstruction. Students
of tort law might say that all this is nothing more than the question of cau-
sation, as addressed earlier; we would like to know whether the injury suf-
fered by a patient would have occurred anyway had the doctor applied for a
license or had the particular patient gone to see a substitute (I would say av-
erage rather than marginal) doctor. In turn, the point about the degree of
certainty may simply correspond to our need to find out whether causation
was more likely than not. But there seems to be something more going on
here. One way to express this sensation is to repeat the idea that where we
think permission would have been unlikely, we are unimpressed by actual
evidence that a particular unlicensed actor would have been granted permis-
sion. Thus, one who is apprehended after engaging in what other witnesses
describe as a theft or assault or kidnapping is neither excused nor even of-
fered the opportunity to try and re-create either an original or ex post per-
mission. Such permission might tell us something about causation, and its
availability as a tool for the defense would improve rather worsen the preci-
sion of the underlying deterrence system. Presumably, there is some con-
cern about error costs and some asymmetry in our assessment of these
errors. Better a little chilling of desirable taking and touching, we say,
rather than excess encouraging of theft and assault. These are some of the
very things that lead to a licensing scheme in the first place.
54 The discussion is limited to cases where it is fairly certain that when a claim is filed the insurer
will discover the shortcoming of the application. An example is an error or misrepresentation as to age
in a life insurance application, or about the presence of a sprinkler system in a fire insurance application.
Most states hold that any material misrepresentation in an insurance contract will allow the insurer to
void the policy, whether or not the insured intentionally made the misrepresentation. See generally 7
COUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 35:108-130 (2d ed. 1996); 12A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 7271-7305 (1992). On the other hand, materiality turns on a demonstration of reliance. The misrep-
resentation must have caused the insurance company to issue a policy that it would otherwise have re-
fused or, in some but not all courts, issued at a different premium. Compare Mutual Benefit Life Ins.
Co. v. JMR Elecs. Corp., 848 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1988) (allowing insurance company to avoid contract
where insured misrepresented his history of cigarette smoking in order to obtain the policy at a lower
premium rate) and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Lodzinski, 194 A. 79, 81 (NJ. Eq. 1937) (allowing in-
surance company to avoid contract when insured lied about her health in order to obtain life insurance,
where insured was in her last stages of tuberculosis and must have known that no insurance company
would have offered her coverage) with Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Allingham, 457 F.2d 21
(10th Cir. 1972) (enforcing insurance contract despite insured's misrepresentations because none of the
alleged misrepresentations was material to the insurer's evaluation of the overall risk).
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It may also be the case that we are uncertain of our ability to re-create
the licensing application especially where decisionmaking is in the hands of
a party who does not represent the society at large and who has some biases
that may go against the social interest. Consider, for example, the recent
story55 of a judge whose permanent clerk failed to obtain the judge's per-
mission, as required by the rules of his court, before moonlighting in the
practice of law. As detection became certain, the clerk confessed the matter
to his judge, who was then willing to say falsely that he had granted permis-
sion ex ante as required by the rules. We can be fairly certain that this
judge would have been willing to say that his permission had not been re-
quested at the correct time but that had he been asked he would have given
ex ante permission. The attempted, assisted recovery from the permission
slip did not save the clerk-and it led to disciplinary action against the
judge as well. The alternative avenue open to the helpful judge, of insisting
that he would have granted ex ante approval, would of course have saved
the judge but almost surely not the clerk. The strategy that was deployed
involved greater risk, because of the fear of detection, and greater return, at
least to the clerk.
The result is unsurprising, but why? An attractive explanation begins
with the idea that the judge regards the penalty that would be imposed on
the unauthorized clerk as too great. He is willing to dissemble-and per-
haps to fool himself-because he thinks he has superior information about
what justice requires. We fear, however, that the judge fails to internalize
the social interest in encouraging ex ante permission (and honesty).5 6 This
idea can be put to the test if a case arises in which the clerk practices law
without the judge's permission, but other clerks seek permission as re-
quired, and the judge invariably has responded with his blessing, or even
with comments to the effect that he thinks such moonlighting is good.57 In
this sort of case, the optimistic version of Murray is in essence re-created
rather faithfully.58  Similarly, if the rule had called for approval by a disin-
terested and perhaps even uninterested third party, an interim period of un-
authorized practice by the clerk might not be viewed as terribly troubling.
55 See Joseph P. Fried, Panel Censures Brooklyn Judgefor Lying, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8,1995, at 134.
56 The example in the text suggests the familiar difference between public and private enforcement.
" Small doubts will remain. If the unauthorized clerk began practicing earlier than the others, then
there is the possibility that in those earlier days the judge had a different attitude toward the matter. And
if the unauthorized practice followed the licensing of the other clerks, then we might simply say that the
judge had in fact implicitly consented-or might begin to object when too many requests come his way.
The situation is not terribly different from that presented by one who copies published work without
authorization based on previous, successful requests to use copyrighted materials.
58 In any event, I do not think it terrbly useful to understand either Murray or the judge-clerk case
as reflecting nothing more than a distrust of ex post decisionmaking. In the case of the judge who is
consulted late in the game, there is surely the potential for bias in both directions; the judge might be
harsh because he was misled or he might be generous because the clerk turned out to do a good job even
while moonlighting, and so forth. But this sort of potential is found virtually everywhere, and our legal
system often chooses to use more information ex post rather than less biased decisionmaking ex ante.
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This is especially so if the clerk had every reason to anticipate that detection
was inevitable, because this expectation removes the need for a penalty
simply to ensure that the licensing requirement is not ignored. 9
A related question is what to expect or wish for where the clerk will
anticipate that detection is very likely but nevertheless proceeds for an in-
terim period without permission in order to create on his own "test period."
He will then point to the -"test period" as a means of convincing his em-
ployer that his moonlighting did not interfere with his primary employment
responsibilities. In most cases this is an easy question because there is no
reason why the employee cannot ask the employer's permission for a trial
period. The judge is at least as able as the clerk, and perhaps less biased
rather than more, to consider the costs and benefits of provisional licensing.
Indeed, in some cases the test period is better if the judge knows to monitor
the employee's performance more carefully than before. The situation is
much like that encountered in the corporate area where disclosure often
produces benefits (including information about the need to monitor) and no
serious social costs.60
But what if a blind test would make for better judging? In some set-
tings the judge can be told that a test is in progress, so that he or she knows
to monitor more carefully, but can also be kept unbiased. This is how taste
tests for wines, coffees, and toothpastes are normally constructed. In the
judge-clerk case this might be feasible if the judge has a number of clerks
and could be told that, with his consent, one of them will engage in moon-
lighting for a test period. Btt where the judge has but one clerk, where
monitoring is more beneficial than distorting, or where consensual blind
testing is otherwise problematic, something different is required. One pos-
sibility is for the clerk to ask another judge for permission to engage in the
blind test of his own judge. This test would proceed alongside, or confused
by, the self-aware test of the clerk's own performance while moonlight-
ing.61 After some period, the second judge might inquire of the first as to
59 Correspondingly in Murray there is a need to ensure that the rule does not lead the government to
"search now, ask later."
60 The discussion in Section I.B emphasized those cases where disclosure is costly, but this idea
must not detract from more run-of-the-mill cases, discussed in Section ILA, where disclosure is surely
efficient
61 An advantage of a precommitment to a known third party, such as a human experimentation
committee set up for this purpose, is that where the actor can choose a third party of his own (such as the
second judge in the text's illustration) there is not only the danger of his choosing someone he suspects
will be favorable to his cause but also the danger that he will continue to poll "third" parties until one
consents. The problem is acute where it will be difficult to learn later of the several attempts to secure
permission and where there is a range of probability of"err" such that repeat requests are likely to lead
eventually to a judge who consents if only because he is responding at one end of the distribution of his
assessments. We might think of this as the problem of "consenter's curse" where the one who seeks
consent can keep sampling potential consenters, to the detriment of a party who relies on (observable)
consent. Both of these factors (and others as well) are at issue in the familiar situation where parents
chide a child who has failed to receive a desired response from one parent and then consults the other on
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the performance of his clerks, and then reveal the ongoing test. In some
settings, the probability of receiving future requests from employees is suf-
ficiently great that potential "judges" might give some blanket consent to
the interventions of another judge. Thus, human experimentation commit-
tees associated with medical experiments oversee the use of nondisclosure
between experimenters and their subjects, but sometimes these subjects
have, upon entering a hospital for example, consented to being used in ex-
periments in some very general way.
There is thus a case to be made for nondisclosure, or permission slips,
in some settings. 62 Murray is in part about doing the best we can where
there was a slip but where it might be possible to get back on track and re-
constitute the licensing system in decent fashion. Most of the interesting
corporate opportunity cases, as well as the cases discussed in the present
Part, involve circumstances where the original failure to obtain permission
may itself be desirable. In all these cases, of course, the point is that less
disclosure may be better than more. Human experimentation committees
and the judge-clerk case suggest that perhaps we give more thought to the
possibility of tolerating unlicensed activity, in the private and public
spheres, where the unlicensed actor secures permission to proceed in an un-
licensed manner. It goes almost without saying that this kind of a license to
engage in activity without another license may be a decent way to develop
data about the efficacy of some licensing systems. The search warrant and
corporate fiduciary settings are not, however, the best examples for further
exploration because these are not areas where overachieving or lazy interest
groups benefit from licensing systems and are therefore unlikely to test
the same matter without revealing the earlier result. Other examples include a repeat applicant for a job
or place in a university, one who takes a standardized exam multiple times, and a defendant who wishes
to introduce evidence of a polygraph test. Extra information of unambiguous value may be provided
with repeat testing so long as the observer knows of the earlier tests. The bias, or curse, then disappears
if one is able to process all the information correctly. If the curse is not so easily avoided, then a better
approach might be to attach some cost to each appeal, but this is a subject far beyond the reach of the
present Article, for it brings us to the question of legal appeals quite generally.
In the search warrant context the problem arises if the police secure a search warrant even after a
warrant was denied by another magistrate on similar facts. See United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218,
1233 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'g United States v. Savides, 658 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. IIU. 1987) (holding that the
important questions for determining the validity of a search warrant are whether there was probable
cause and whether the magistrate who issued the warrant was neutral, not whether a different magistrate
had failed to issue a warrant based on the same application). But see United States v. Davis, 346 F.
Supp. 435, 442 (S.D. Ill. 1972) (holding a search illegal because the search warrant authorizing the
search was denied by the first magistrate to whom it was presented and only granted by the second
magistrate), discussed in Charles L. Cantrell, Search Warrants: A View of the Process, 14 OKLA. CrrY
U. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1989) (discussing the practice of "magistrate shopping"). The question is also
close to that presented by repeated requests to legislatures or voters. If the cost of asking is low, then we
might wish for there to be some limit on requests. This may be the case even where the licensing
authority knows of the earlier requests.
62 The advantage of nondisclosure is obvious in the case of such testers as restaurant critics or in-
vestigators who test for housing discrimination.
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these systems in order to evaluate their continuing, or even original, social
utility. This sort of connection, between interest groups and questions
about licensing systems, awaits further sustained inquiry.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has advanced a framework and a claim. The framework
is, of course, built on familiar conceptions of licensing regimes, and my
construction project has aimed to show that we can think of many legal
rules as part of such schemes. Licensing schemes, especially of the dupli-
cative kind, are all around us. We are likely to do better when confronted
with questions regarding noncompliance, penalties, and safe harbors if we
recognize that these are recurring problems for a legal system. In turn, the
claim here has been that less is sometimes better than more. In particular,
unbiased decisionmaking might be advanced by withholding information
from the decisionmaker. At first blush, this sort of strategy seems incom-
patible with the rules expressed in so many areas of law, including that of
corporate opportunities and fiduciary duties, because these rules call for full
disclosure in a variety of explicit and implicit ways. But closer analysis re-
veals that law is often sensitive to the occasional costs of disclosure, and it
may not be too much of a stretch to argue that law can be understood as
supporting unbiased decisionmaking even where it means that information
is intentionally withheld. In any event, there is room for future litigants, in
cases ranging across private and public law, to draw attention to cases
where less is better than more.
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